EU Law as Private International Law?
Re-conceptualising the Country-of-Origin Principle as Vested Rights Theory*

I. EU LAW AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW1

If private international law is widely considered too technical to stir passions in the wider
population, such considerations may have to be rethought. Recently, people all over
Europe took to the streets to protest against a proposed norm of private international law
– the “country-of-origin” principle stated in Article 16 of the proposed services
directive2. Had the proposal become law, providers of services would now be governed
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In this article, I use “private international law” rather than “conflict of laws” or “choice of law” for two
reasons. First, this is in accordance with European usage. Second, it brings out the focus on private interest
that characterizes the country of origin principle better than “conflict of laws” or “choice of law”, both of
which suggest that the relevant question goes to which of several laws is applicable.

2

Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on services in the internal
market (by the Commission), 5 March 2004, COM(2004) 2 final/3, Article 16, “Country of origin
principle”:
(1) Member States shall ensure that providers are subject only to the national provisions of their Member
State of origin which fall within the coordinated field.
Paragraph 1 shall cover national provisions relating to access to and the exercise of a service activity, in
particular those requirements governing the behaviour of the provider, the quality or content of the service,
advertising, contracts and the provider's liability.
(2) The Member State of origin shall be responsible for supervising the provider and the services provided
by him, including services provided by him in another Member State.
(3) Member States may not, for reasons falling within the coordinated field, restrict the freedom to provide
services in the case of a provider established in another Member State, in particular, by imposing any of the
following requirements:
(a) an obligation on the provider to have an establishment in their territory;
(b) an obligation on the provider to make a declaration or notification to, or to obtain an authorisation
from, their competent authorities, including entry in a register or registration with a professional body
or association in their territory;
(c) an obligation on the provider to have an address or representative in their territory or to have an
address for service at the address of a person authorized in that territory;
(d) a ban on the provider setting up a certain infra structure in their territory, including an office or
chambers, which the provider needs to supply the services in question;
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largely by the laws of their countries of origin alone, and the application of rules of the
country of destination would be severely restricted. Fear of the infamous mystical “Polish
Plumber” abounded, a plumber who would allegedly be both so cheap that domestic
plumbers could not compete, and so unreliable (because only lax Polish laws would apply
to him) that he would be dangerous for the well-being of other member states. Whatever
the validity of these fears3 – protests against this norm were an important reason why the
EU Constitutional Treaty failed in referenda in France and in the Netherlands,4 and why
the Commission has replaced the country-of-origin principle with a much milder
principle of mutual recognition.5
But is the country-of-origin principle a private international law norm at all? It is hard to
say, since the relationship between private international law and EU law is still somewhat
undefined. Indeed, for a long time, scholars in both areas worked in splendid isolation
from each other. To private international lawyers, EU law sometimes appeared on the
periphery as a minor nuisance, but it could mostly be ignored.6 The new EU competence

(e) an obligation on the provider to comply with requirements, relating to the exercise of a service
activity, applicable in their territory;
(f) the application of specific contractual arrangements between the provider and the recipient which
prevent or restrict service provision by the self-employed;
(g) an obligation on the provider to possess an identity document issued by its competent authorities
specific to the exercise of a service activity;
(h) requirements which affect the use of equipment which is an integral part of the service provided;
(i) restrictions on the freedom to provide the services referred to in Article 20, the first subparagraph of
Article 23(1) or Article 25(1).
3

In using the “Polish plumber” as a prime example at various points in this paper, I refer to an example
frequently used to express pertaining fears in public debates, but take no view on whether these fears are
justified. Nor do I analyze to what extent exactly the Service directive would actually make only Polish law
applicable to him. These questions were hotly debated and widely unclear; they have become moot in the
most recent proposals. My point in this paper is conceptual – how would a country of origin function if it
applied – rather than substantive.
4

Paul Taggart, “Keynote Article: Questions of Europe – The Domestic Politics of the 2005 French and
Dutch Referendums and their Challenge for the Study of European Integration” (2006) 44 Journal of
Common Market Studies, Annual Review 7, 16.
5

“Editorial comments: The services directive proposal: Striking a balance between the promotion of the
internal market and preserving the European social model?” (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 307,
309. For the changes made, see Amended Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on Services in the Internal Market (presented by the Commission), 4 April 2006, COM(2006) 160
final, Article 16 with comments at pp. 10-12. See now Common Position adopted by the Council with a
view to the adoption of a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on services in the
internal market, 17 July 2006, Doc. 10003/06, Article 16.
6

But see, for some early analyses, René Savatier, “Le Marché Commun au regard du droit international
privé “ (1959) Revue critique de droit international privé 237; id., “Les aspects du droit international privé
de la Communauté Économique “, in Travaux du Comité Français de droit international privé 1960-1962
(Paris, Dalloz, 1963) 17; Konrad Zweigert, “Einige Auswirkungen des Gemeinsamen Marktes auf das
internationale Privatrecht der der Mitgliedstaaten “, in Ernst von Cammerer et al (eds), Probleme des
europäischen Rechts. Festschrift für Walter Hallstein zu seinem 65. Geburtstag (Frankfurt/M.,
Klostermann, 1966) 555. For two recent accounts of the history, see Jannet A. Pontier, Europees
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for private international law expressed in Articles 61, 65 of the EC Treaty7 has not
changed much in this respect, since what the EU legislates in this realm is, in shape and
approach, widely compatible with traditional private international law.8 For EU lawyers,
by contrast, private international law, with all its expertise, was no more than a small and
negligible field of technical niceties that was not expected to, and mostly did not, stand in
the way of the common market and its law.
If such happy co-existence (or mutual ignorance) was ever possible, it no longer is.
Traditional private international law and EU law clash with ever-increasing frequency.
The infamous “country-of-origin principle” does not pose the only challenge to
traditional private international law; other challenges come from the rules on nondiscrimination.9 Yet private international lawyers have not found an adequate response;
they still struggle, even at a conceptual level, with the need to make sense of EU law.
Many conflicts scholars react in one of two ways. Some complain that European law
develops in ignorance of private international law. While this complaint is not entirely
unjustified, the consequence that they often draw – to leave private international law
unaltered – seems both unrealistic and unattractive. Other private international lawyers
concede defeat and suggest (or deplore) a reformulation of private international law in the
face of EU law, replacing the traditional conflicts norm with a principle of mutual
recognition.10 In doing this, they seem too willing to concede that after centuries their
own discipline has lost its relevance.

conflictenrecht – Een complexe geschiedenis in vogelvlucht (Amsterdam, Vossiuspers, 2005); Karl
Kreuzer, “Zu Stand und Perspektiven des Europäischen Internationalen Privatrechts – Wie europäisch soll
das Europäische Internationale Privatrecht sein?“ 70 (2006) RabelsZ 1, 8-30 (2006). For an argument to
treat all EU law as conflict of laws, see Christian Joerges, “The Challenges of Europeanization in the
Realm of Private Law: A Plea for a New Legal Discipline” (2004) 14 Duke International and Comparative
Law Journal 149; Christian Joerges, “European Law as Conflict of Laws“ in Christian Joerges & Jürgen
Neyers, “’Deliberative Supranationalism’ Revisited“. EUI Working Paper Law No 2006/20, 15, 23 ff; see
also Andreas Furrer, Zivilrecht im gemeinschaftsrechtlichen Kontext – Das Europäische Kollisionsrecht als
Koordinierungsinstrument für die Einbindung des Zivilrechts in das europäische Wirtschaftsrecht (Berne,
Stämpfli, 2002); Christoph Schmid, Die Instrumentalisierung des Privatrechts durch die EU (BadenBaden, Nomos, forthcoming).
7 See Jürgen Basedow, “The Communitarization of the Conflict of Laws under the Treaty of Amsterdam”
(2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 687; Oliver Remien, “European Private International Law, the
European Community and Its Emerging Area of Freedom, Security and Justice” (2001) 38 Common Market
Law Review 53.
8

But see Jürgen Basedow, “Spécificité et coordination du droit international privé communautaire “, in
Travaux du comité français de droit international privé 2002-2004 (Paris, Pédone, 2005), 275 (arguing that
federalized codification of private international law is a novelty).
9

E.g. for the private law of names in case of double nationality: Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello, decision
of October 2, 2003, [2003] ECR-I 11613; Case C-96/04 Stadt Niebüll, Opinion of the Advocate General of
June 30, 2005, paras 56-7. (The Court of Justice decided on April 27, 2006 it had no jurisdiction over the
case.) Avello is interpreted as a return to Savignyan private international law by Tito Ballarino & Benedetta
Ubertazzi, “On Avello and Other Judgments: A New Departure in the Conflict of Laws?” (2004) Yearbook
of Private International Law 85, 124-9.
10

See (critically) Erik Jayme & Kohler, “Europäisches Kollisionsrecht 2001: Anerkennungsprinzip statt
IPR?“ [2001] Praxis des internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax) 501; Paul Lagarde,
“Développements futures du droit international privé dans une Europe en voie d’unification: quelques
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Both reactions are equally unsatisfactory. Since both fail to make the country-of-origin
principle and private international law commensurable, they yield the opportunity for
private international law to contribute its disciplinary knowledge and expertise to debates
about the common market. As a consequence, EU law has been able to develop in this
area, largely unchallenged by private international lawyers; in the “contest of legal
disciplines”,11 EU law so far holds the upper hand. I suggest instead that private
international lawyers should recognize the debate about EU law as one that plays out in
the heart of their own discipline, as one to which they have much to contribute because of
their own specific experience. However, this requires them to broaden their view.
Ironically, some of the fully justified criticism against EU scholars – they do not
understand private international law – falls back on private-international-law scholars
themselves. Many of them are too quick to equate their discipline with a specific
approach, the post-Savignyan approach that is currently prevailing.12
Once we take a broader perspective we find that the country-of-origin principle displays a
remarkable degree of similarities to an old approach that has almost been forgotten. This
approach is known as the vested rights theory. Private international lawyers can be
excused for not thinking of that theory when they look at the country-of-origin principle.
After all, the vested rights theory has been as thoroughly discarded as any theory ever
has, while the country-of-origin principle, despite its recent setback in the Services
Directive, seems alive and well. However, this difference does not suggest that both are
incomparable; it suggests only how the force of any criticism is contingent upon the
framework within which a theory works. Indeed, comparing both the theories and the
respective criticism against it teaches us a lot about both the vested rights theory and
about the country-of-origin principle, and it helps us towards a fuller understanding of
European private international law.
This paper makes these three claims:
(1) The country-of-origin principle in EU law is best understood by analogizing it to
the vested rights theory in private international law.
(2) The country-of-origin principle can counter most of the challenges that brought the
vested rights theory down.
(3) Contemporary European private international law is characterized by the lasting
tension between traditional private international law and the country-of-origin
principle. This tension creates the flexibility that is both appropriate and necessary for
private international law to play its role in the evolving common market.

conjectures“ (2004) 68 RabelsZ 225; Dagmar Coester-Waltjen, “Das Anerkennungsprinzip im
Dornröschenschlaf?“ in HP Mansel, (ed), Festschrift für Erik Jayme I (Munich, Sellier, 2004) 121.
11

Joerges, supra n 6, 154. For the origin of the quote, see Immanuel Kant, “The Contest of Faculties” in
H.S. Reiss (ed), Kant – Political Writings (2nd ed. 1991) (Der Streit der Fakultäten [1798]).

12

For Savigny’s continued (or renewed) importance, see Matthias Reimann, “Savigny's Triumph? Choice
of Law in Contracts Cases at the Close of the Twentieth Century” (1999) 39 Virginia Journal of
International Law 571; Ralf Michaels, “Globalizing Savigny?”, http://ssrn.com/abstract=796228, in
Michael Stolleis & Wolfgang Streeck (eds), Politik und Recht unter den Bedingung der Dezentralisierung
und Globalisierung (Baden-Baden, Nomos, forthcoming).
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These claims are addressed in turn. Part II substantiates the first claim, the similarity
between the vested rights theory and the country-of-origin principle. This Part first
presents different variants of vested rights theories before pointing out the numerous
similarities with the country-of-origin principle and these theories. Part III substantiates
the second claim, the resilience of the country-of-origin principle against the criticism
brought forward against the vested rights theory. It first shows the different arguments
brought forward against the vested rights theory and shows how they are rehashed in the
debate about the country-of-origin principle, before demonstrating that they all fail, more
or less, with regard to the country-of-origin principle. Part IV, the conclusion, is devoted
to the third claim, regarding the lasting tension in European private international law
between different methods and policies. Instead of rejecting these tensions, that Part
argues that we should embrace them as fertile for a developing area of the law. First,
however, the remainder of this Part presents the conflict between the country-of-origin
principle and traditional private international law, as well as the different proposals that
have been made to conceptualize the relationship before concluding that a broader
concept of private international law is needed for this conceptualization.
A.

PRACTICAL CONFLICTS

That private international law and the country-of-origin principle indeed conflict can be
seen from either side of the disciplinary divide – from the side of European private
international law, and from the side of secondary and primary EU law.
1. Private-International-Law Regulations
Within private international law, the potential clash with EU law was slow to emerge.
The Rome Convention of 1980 on the law applicable to contractual obligations contains
only a provision in its Article 20 that gives priority to choice-of-law rules in EU
legislation.13 Conflicts with norms of EU law not shaped as private-international-law
rules were apparently not considered. Since 1980, the possibility of such conflicts has
become clearer to the Commission, but not easier to solve. The Green Paper of 2002 on
the conversion of the Rome Convention into a Community Instrument still tried to shirk
the issue:
The present document does not intend to examine the relationship between a possible
future instrument and the Internal Market rules. For the Commission it is clear,
however, that such an instrument should leave intact the principles of the Internal
Market laid down in the Treaty or in secondary legislation.14

13

Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Consolidated Version) [1998] OJ
C27, 34. Article 20 reads: “This Convention shall not affect the application of provisions which, in relation
to particular matters, lay down choice-of-law rules relating to contractual obligations and which are or will
be contained in acts of the institutions of the European Communities or in national laws harmonized in
implementation of such acts.”

14

Green Paper on the conversion of the Rome Convention of 1980 on the law applicable to contractual
obligations into a Community instrument and its modernisation, COM (2002) 654 final, 14 January 2003,
p 5. The French version is more strict and uses the word devra (“will have to”), this stricter use can also be
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By contrast, the 2003 preliminary draft proposal for a Regulation on the law applicable to
non-contractual obligations (“Rome II”) includes an explicit provision regarding the
conflict in its Article 23(2):
This regulation shall not prejudice the application of Community instruments which,
in relation to particular matters and in areas coordinated by such instruments, subject
the supply of services or goods to the laws of the Member State where the serviceprovider is established and, in the area coordinated, allow restrictions on freedom to
provide services or goods originating in another Member State only in limited
circumstances.15
Finally, in the most recent versions, Article 22(c) of the Rome I Proposal16 and Article
3(d) of the Rome II Proposal17 both read,
This Regulation shall not prejudice the application or adoption of acts of the
institutions of the European Communities which … lay down rules to promote the
smooth operation of the internal market, where such rules cannot apply at the same
time as the law designated by the rules of private international law.
Several developments are observable. First, the problem of a potential conflict between
private international law norms and principles of the internal market, including the
country-of-origin principle has been recognized and acknowledged only gradually.
Second, the scope of the exception from private international law has grown over time.
Whereas the Rome Convention makes such an exception only for explicit private
international law, and the 2003 Rome II proposal was aimed only at specific directives,
the current texts are apparently not limited in scope. Third, the expansion of scope
coincides with a diminution of clarity. Whereas the Rome Convention is clear in its focus
on explicit private-international-law norms, and the 2003 Rome II proposal was clear at
least in its focus on specific instruments,18 the current text gives no guidelines as to how
exactly the exception should be delimited. Do not nearly all acts of EU law “lay down
rules to promote the smooth operation of the internal market”? How can it be the case
that “such rules cannot apply at the same time as the law designated by the rules of
private international law”? After all, the private-international-law regulations themselves
must be “necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market” if the EU wants to

found in the draft proposal for the Services Directive (supra n 2) at p 17, which, when quoting the Green
Paper, replaces “should” with “must”.
15

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the Law Applicable to NonContractual Obligations (“Rome II”), 22 July 2003, COM (2003) 427 final.

16

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the Law Applicable to
Contractual Obligations (Rome I) (presented by the Commission), 15 December 2005, COM (2005) 650
final.

17

Amended proposal for a European Parliament and Council Regulation on the Law Applicable to NonContractual Obligations (“Rome II”), 21 Feb 2006, COM (2006) 83 final.

18

But see, for criticism, Hamburg Group for Private International Law, “Comments on the European
Commission’s Draft Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual
Obligations”, (2003) 67 RabelsZ 1, 54-55.

-6-

claim competence under Article 65 of the EC Treaty.19 Indeed, the regulations are
repeatedly justified as necessary for the functioning of the internal market.20 How can
they at the same time be in conflict with this market?
2. The Country-of-Origin Principle in Directives
If EU legislation on private international law is unclear regarding its relationship with the
country-of-origin principle, EU legislation providing for such a principle is hardly clearer
regarding its relationship to traditional private international law. Some older directives,
like the television-without-frontiers directive of 1989, include provisions restricting the
country of destination from applying its own law to service providers from other member
states, but the relationship to private international law is not addressed.21 The ecommerce directive of 200022 revealed that the Commission was aware of the problem
but utterly unable to resolve it. Its Article 3 of the directive provides that, within the
coordinated field, information service providers need comply only with the provisions of
the member state where they are established (Article 3(1)), while other member states
may not, for reasons falling within the coordinated field, restrict the freedom to provide
information services from another Member State (Article 3(2), and the destination
country may derogate from this only for purposes of public policy, public health, public
security, and the protection of consumers and investors (Article 13(4)). This looks like a
private-international-law norm that declares the laws of the country of establishment
applicable and the laws of the country of destination inapplicable except when these
conflict with specific public policy. Yet mysteriously, Article 1(4) of the Directive
proclaims that “[t]his Directive does not establish additional rules on private international

19

Whether Article 65 is an appropriate basis for private international law legislation or whether such
legislation must be based on Articles 94, 95 of the Treaty, is irrelevant for purposes of this argument, since
both make it a condition that private international law regulations are in fact necessary for the functioning
of the internal market. This is not the subject of this article; see, for two recent critical views, Paul R
Beaumont, “Private international law of the European Union: competence questions arising from the
proposed Rome II regulation on choice of law in non-contractual obligations”, in Private Law, Private
International Law and Judicial Cooperation in the EU-US Relationship (Thomson/West, CILE Studies Vol
2, 2005), 15; Andrew Dickinson, “European Private International Law: Embracing New Horizons or
Mourning the Past?” (2005) 1 Journal of Private International Law 197.

20

See Rome I Proposal, supra n 16, Recitals 1, 4; Amended Rome II Proposal, supra n 17, Recitals 1, 4.

21

Council Directive 89/552/EEC of 3 October 1989 on the co-ordination of certain provisions laid down by
law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting
activities [1989] OJ L298/23; amended by Directive 97/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 30 June 1997 [1997] OJ L202/60. On the scope of the country-of-origin principle, see ECJ 9
July 1997, Joined cases C-34/95, C-35/95, and C-36/95; Konsumentombudsmannen KO v De Agostini
(Svenska) Forlag AB; Konsumentbodsmannen v TV Shop i Sverige AB. For characterization as a private
international law norm, see Alexander Thünken, “Multistate Advertising over the Internet and the Private
International Law of Unfair Competition” (2002) 51 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 909,
939.

22

Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal
aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive
on electronic commerce), [2000] OJ L178/1.
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law nor does it deal with the jurisdiction of Courts.”23 This apparent internal
inconsistency has led to an intense (and largely inconclusive) debate about whether the
country-of-origin principle in Article 3 “really” is a private-international-law rule or
not.24 Regardless of such doctrinal debates, the country-of-origin principle in the
directive has real implications for private international law: In 2003, the Court of Justice
decided that German courts cannot apply certain German rules against the sale and
advertising of non-prescription medicines, even though these rules would be applicable
under a normal choice-of-law analysis.25
The proposed Services Directive finally has moved the problem to the centre of attention.
In Article 16(1) of its 2004 proposal, the Commission went beyond adopting a countryof-origin principle only for a coordinated area and required that service providers
generally should have to comply only with the rules of their countries of origin.26 Article
19 includes an exception clause for matters of safety, health profession, and public
policy. Had this become law, it would have created an unavoidable clash with traditional
private-international-law norms, which regularly designate laws other than that of the
country of origin as applicable: the law of the affected market,27 of the consumer’s
habitual residence,28 or of the place of the injury.29 Would the famous “Polish Plumber”,
working in England, be governed by Polish contract law? Would even his liability in tort
be governed by Polish law? Under private international law, the law applicable to
contractual and non-contractual obligations would be English law. But certainly those
rules are “provisions relating to … the exercise of a service activity” (Article 16(1)), and
these rules, or the results of their application, could constitute restrictions of the freedom
23

See also Recital 23: “This Directive neither aims to establish additional rules on private international law
relating to conflicts of law nor does it deal with the jurisdiction of Courts; provisions of the applicable law
designated by rules of private international law must not restrict the freedom to provide services as
established in this Directive.”
24

See only Peter Mankowski, ”Das Herkunftslandprinzip als Internationales Privatrecht der e-commerceRichtlinie“ 100 Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft 137 (2001); Stefan Grundmann, ”Das
Internationale Privatrecht der E-Commerce-Richtlinie – was ist kategorial anders im Kollisionsrecht des
Binnenmarkts und warum?“ (2003) 67 RabelsZ 246; Gert de Baere, ”’Is this a Conflict Rule which I see
Before Me?’ Looking for a Hidden Conflict Rule in the Principle of Origin as Implemented in Primary
European Community Law and in the Directive on Electronic Commerce”, (2004) 11 Maastricht Journal of
European and Comparative Law 287, 305-317; Olivier Cachard, “Le domaine coordonné par la directive
sur le commerce électronique et le droit international privé” (2004) International Business Law Journal
161; all with further references.

25

Case C-322/01, Deutscher Apothekerverband eV v 0800 DocMorris NV and Jacques Waterval, [2003]
ECR I-14887; English case note by Richard Lang at (2005) 42 Common Market Law Review 189; see also
Christofer Lenz, “Warenverkehrsfreiheit nach der DocMorris-Entscheidung zum Versand von
Arzneimitteln“ 2004 Neue juristische Wochenschrift 332; Elmar Mand, “E-Commerce mit Arzneimitteln –
Auswirkungen des Herkunftslandprinzips auf das Internationale Wettbewerbsrecht“ 2003 Multimediarecht
77.

26

Supra n 2.

27

See Dieter Martiny, “Die Anknüpfung an den Markt“, in Festschrift für Ulrich Drobnig zum siebzigsten
Geburtstag (Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 1998) 389.
28
29

Rome I Proposal, supra n 16, Article 5(1).
Amended Rome II Proposal, supra n 17, Article 5(1).
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to provide services? Indeed, the Commission seemed to assume that rules determined by
traditional private international law would play only a residual role.30 Largely, privateinternational-law rules for contracts entered into, and torts committed by, services
providers would remain inapplicable.31
After stark protest from numerous sides, including the European Parliament, the
Commission has now replaced the country-of-origin principles in Article 16 with a milder
provision requiring member states to grant the freedom to provide services, a provision
that looks much less like a private-international-law norm.32 Furthermore, Article 17(20)
now provides an explicit exception for “provisions regarding contractual and noncontractual obligations, including the form of contracts, determined pursuant to the rules
of private international law.” A similar change took place between the first proposal and
the final version of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive. Whereas the 2003
proposal included a country-of-origin rule very similar to Article 16 of the services
directive,33 the final directive states a mere internal market rule.34 The scope for
traditional private law is therefore widened, but the relationship remains unclear.

30

See Services Directive Proposal, supra n 2, p 17 (under the slightly ironic heading of “Coherence with
other Community Policies”): “they could, however, play an important role not only for the activities which
are not covered by this Directive but also for the questions which are the object of derogations to the
country-of-origin principle, notably the derogation in relation to contracts concluded by consumers, as well
as the derogation relating to the non-contractual liability of the provider in the case of an accident occurring
in the context of his activity which affects a person in a Member State which a provider visits.”

31

See also Jürgen Basedow, “Herkunftslandsprinzip und Internationales Privatrecht im europäischen
Binnenmarkt für Dienstleistungen“, in Rozprawy prawnicze. Księga pamiątkowa Profesora Maksymiliana
Pazdana (Zakamycze 2005), 29, 41-42.

32

Supra n 5; for criticism, see Editorial Comments, supra n 5; Charlemagne, “Not Yet Free to Serve” The
Economist, Feb 18th, 2006. The Common Position of the Council, supra n 5, goes back even to the unclear
position of the e-commerce directive. Its Article 3(2) reads:
This Directive does not concern rules of private international law, in particular rules governing the law
applicable to contractual and non-contractual obligations, including those which guarantee that
consumers benefit from the protection granted to them by the consumer protection rules laid down in
the consumer legislation in force in their Member State.
See also consideration no 90, ibid at p. 39.
33

Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning unfair business-toconsumer commercial practices in the internal market (the unfair commercial practices Directive), 17 June
2003, COM (2003) Article 4.
34

Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair
business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive
84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial
Practices Directive’) [2005] OJ L149/22; see Jules Stuyck, Evelyne Terryn, Tom van Dyck, “Confidence
through fairness? The new Directive on unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal
market” (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 107, 117-120.
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3. Primary Law and the Law of Corporations
These questions are not restricted to private international law regulations and to
directives. A third, well-known example concerns the impact of primary law on the
private international law of corporations. The Court of Justice addressed these issues in
its case trilogy in Centros, Überseering, and Inspire Art.35 In Centros, the Court of
Justice ordered Denmark to register the subsidiary of a corporation that two Danish
citizens had registered under English law, although their only reason for using UK law
had been to avoid the registration fees for Danish companies under Danish law. In
Überseering, the Court held that Germany could not deny a corporation registered under
Dutch law the capacity to sue in Germany, even if the company lacked legal capacity
under German law, since it did not comply with the German laws applicable under
German private international law because all shares had been purchased by German
domiciliaries so the effective seat was in Germany. Finally, in Inspire Art, the Court
made clear that the Netherlands could not impose additional requirements on a
corporation registered under UK law on the basis that it was a “pseudo foreign
corporation”, although that was exactly what the corporation in question was, never
having conducted any business outside the Netherlands.
This case law makes it possible to register a company in country A even if that company
conducts its entire business in country B, although the private-international-law rules of
many member states require a more genuine link to the country of registration for
recognition of a corporation’s full legal capacity. Although this case law therefore creates
an obvious tension with private international law, its precise impact on private
international law is not clear. The Court of Justice never addressed the questions posed as
questions of choice of law, but instead resolved them under Arts. 43 and 48 of the EC
Treaty. Indeed, some have argued that this case law applies only on the level of
substantive law and leaves private-international-law norms intact. Nonetheless, for the
highest courts in Austria and in Germany these decisions became the impetus to shift
their private-international-law norms from a real-seat principle to a registration
principle.36
Whether such a modification was required by the case law is far from clear. Still
unresolved, at least from a private international law perspective, is the relevance of the
earlier decision in Daily Mail, where the Court had held, sweepingly, that “companies are
creatures of the law and, in the present state of Community law, creatures of national law.

35

Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, decision of 3/9/1999 [1999] ECR I-1459;
Case C-208/00, Überseering B.V. v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH (NCC),
decision of 11/5/2002 [2002] ECR I-9919; Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor
Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd., decision of 9/30/2003 [2003] ECR I-10155.

36

Oberster Gerichtshof (Austria), decision of 15 July 1999, [1999] Österreichisches Recht der Wirtschaft
719; Bundesgerichtshof (Germany), decision of 13 March 2003 - VII ZR 370/98, 154 Entscheidungen des
Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen (BGHZ) 185; Bundesgerichtshof (Germany), decision of 14 March 2005
- II ZR 5/03, (2005) Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 805; see also the contribution by Federal Court judge
Wulf Goette, “Zu den Folgen der Anerkennung ausländischer Gesellschaften mit tatsächlichem Sitz im
Inland für die Haftung ihrer Gesellschafter und Organe“, (2006) 27 Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (ZIP)
541.
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They exist only by virtue of the varying national legislation which determines their
incorporation and functioning.”37 In the case this meant English law could determine that
an English company could lose its legal personality if it transferred its administrative seat
away from England. That Daily Mail has never been overruled38 leads to an apparent
inconsistency: The freedoms of the EC Treaty allow a company founded under the law of
member state A to transfer its seat to member state B regardless of the law of state B, but
not regardless of the law of member state A. It seems as though the law of state B has to
comply with rigid requirements from EU law, while member state A is free to do as it
pleases. What looks like an inconsistency for EU law is also a problem for private
international law.39 Daily Mail seemed to suggest that EU law has no impact on the
conflict of laws because it explicitly made the recognition of companies contingent on the
applicable national law. The Centros trilogy, on the other hand, seems to suggest a
significant impact.
4. Three Kinds of Conflict
The conflict between the country-of-origin principle and traditional private international
law has three dimensions: a substantive, an institutional, and a methodological
dimension.
The substantive conflict is a conflict between different sets of connecting factors.40 The
country-of-origin principle, regardless of whether it “is” a private-international-law rule
or not, conflicts with the application of traditional private international law simply
because the latter often designates the law of the country of destination as applicable.
Consumer contracts, for example, are governed by the law of the passive consumer’s
habitual residence, which is not the country of origin for a foreign provider. In tort law, in
the proposed Rome II Regulation, as in the vast majority of national legal systems, the
applicable law is the law of the place of the injury. Again, if, for example, a provider of
TV reports sitting in member state A defames a prominent person in state B, the countryof-origin (state A) and the place of the injury (state B) do not coincide. In general, for
regulatory laws like laws of commercial advertising, etc., the typical approach is to apply
the law of the country whose market has been targeted, while a country-of-origin
principle restricts that country’s law. And in private international law for corporations,
where many countries apply the law of the place of the administrative seat, a similar
disconnect occurs. A country-of-origin principle will therefore often clash with choice-

37

Case No 81/87, The Queen v Treasury and Commissioners of Inland Revenue, ex parte Daily Mail and
General Trust [1988] ECR 5483, no 19; similarly Lea Brilmayer, Conflict of Laws (Englewood Cliffs, NJ,
Aspen Publishers, 1995) 242.
38

But see now Case C-411/03, SEVIC Systems AG, 13 December 2005 [2005] ECR I-10805; Case C446/03, 13 December 2005, Marks & Spencer Plc v Halsey (Inspector of Taxes) [2005] ECR I-10837.
These newer decisions seem to suggest that discrimination between corporations acting within the founding
state and corporations acting transnationally can constitute a violation of Articles 43, 48.

39

Wulf-Henning Roth, “Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht nach Überseering“ [2003] IPRax 117, 121.
Miguel Virgós Soriano/Francisco J. Garcimartín Alférez, “Estado de origen v. estado de destino – Las
diferentes lógicas del Derecho internacional privado” InDret 4/2004, article no 251, 2, available at
http://www.indret.com/pdf/251_es.pdf.
40
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of-law rules because both designate the rules of different legal systems as applicable. The
European legislator tries to address this problem by carving out exceptions. Thus, on the
one hand, consumer contracts are excepted from the proposed Services Directive,41 on the
other hand, media liability is excepted from the most recent proposal for the Rome II
Regulation.42 Such an issue by issue approach cannot resolve the fundamental conflict; in
fact, because it is unprincipled, it may rather serve to exacerbate it.
This substantive conflict is enhanced by three institutional conflicts. Within the EU
Commission, it reflects the infamous dispute between the Directorate General Internal
Market on the one hand, favouring a country-of-origin principle, and the Directorate
General Justice and Home Affairs on the other, defending traditional private international
law.43 At the same time, it reflects a more general institutional conflict between the
Commission and the member states. The Commission favours an approach that enhances
legislative competition and restricts the member states’ ability to discriminate against
non-nationals, while the member states favour private-international-law rules that allow
them to maintain their regulatory competences. Finally, a quasi-institutional conflict
should not be neglected – that between scholars of private international law and scholars
of European Union law. The methodological approach of those writers who are
influential will influence, in turn, how the relationship between the fields develops in the
future.
This quasi-institutional, disciplinary conflict translates easily into the third conflict, with
which this paper deals primarily: the methodological conflict between European law on
the one hand and private international law on the other. Is the country-of-origin principle
chiefly a rule of European law that leaves private international law intact? Or does it
rather replace private international law entirely? Does it force private international law to
adopt new rules? Or even a new methodology? And can private international law, in turn,
be influential in any way on the country-of-origin principle itself? To answer these
questions, it is first necessary to analyze the relationship between the two fields.
B. THEORETICAL ACCOUNTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP

What connections exist between the country-of-origin principle on the one hand, and
private international law on the other? The literature provides essentially five different
answers.

41

Amended Proposal, supra n 5, Article 3(2); Common Position, supra supra n 5, Article 3(2). This should
mean that both the EC Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations Art. 5 and choice of
law provisions in EC directives on consumer law prevail over the directive.
42

Amended Rome II Proposal, supra n 17, Article 1(2)(h). The ultimate reason for the exception may have
been a political one – to account for interests of media providers. Since media providers would benefit
from, and in all likelihood prefer, a country of origin rule, this explanation would be consistent with the
analysis provided here.

43

Christian Kohler, “Verständigungsschwierigkeiten zwischen europäischem Gemeinschaftsrecht und
internationalem Privatrecht“ in Festschrift für Erik Jayme I (2004) 445, 457-9; Jürgen Basedow, “EC
Conflict of Laws – A Matter of Coordination“, in Seminàrio Internacional sobre a Comunitarizaçao do
Direito Internacional Privado (Coimbra, Almedina, 2005) 17, 26.
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1. Country of Origin Principle as a Rule Designating the Applicable Law
First is the view that the country-of-origin principle represents an actual privateinternational-law rule that designates the applicable law: the Polish plumber’s services
contracts are largely governed by Polish law, even though he provides his services in
England. The most obvious problem this view must overcome is that the principle does
not look like a private-international-law rule that designates an applicable law.
A first problem with such a translation concerns the structure of the resulting rule. The
country-of-origin principle does not simply designate the applicable law.44 Rather, it
restricts applicability of the law designated by traditional private international law rules if
they are more restrictive than those of the country of origin. If the law of the country of
destination places restrictions in addition to those of the country-of-origin, then it is
inapplicable as a violation of the country-of-origin principle. If, on the other hand, the
law of the country of destination is less restrictive than that of the country-of-origin, it is
not inhibited from applying its less restrictive law. If the rules are less restrictive, the
principle is not violated. The Polish plumber’s contracts are not governed by Polish Law;
rather, English law cannot be applied if it is more restrictive than Polish law. To translate
this into a private international norm requires a special kind of norm, a
Günstigkeitsprinzip, whereby the less restrictive of the laws of origin and those of
destination applies.45
The bigger challenge for such a translation is the fact that the connecting factors used in
the principle are different from those in traditional private international law. Thus, it has
been suggested that the principle departs from the territorial approach dominant in
contemporary private international law and follows rather a personalist approach,
congenial to medieval private international law.46 “Origin” in country-of-origin would
then come to equal “origo”, the traditional connecting factor dismissed by Savigny.47
This is not unusual; it would be a challenge only for strictly territorialist conceptions of
private international law. The bigger problem is that the connecting factor used by the
principle – the country of origin – frequently does not represent the closest connection
and thus does not fulfil the general requirement of traditional private-international-law

44

Cf. Julio D González Campos, “La Cour de Justice des Communautés Européennes et le non-Droit
international privé “ in Festschrift für Erik Jayme I (2004) 263.

45

Jürgen Basedow, “Der kollisionsrechtliche Gehalt der Produktfreiheiten im europäischen Binnenmarkt:
favour offerentis“ (1995) 59 RabelsZ 1, 16-17; Wolfgang Drasch, Das Herkunftslandprinzip im
Internationalen Privatrecht (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1997), 344-49.

46

Michael Hellner, “The Country-of-origin Principles in the E-commerce Directive: A Conflict with
Conflict of Laws?” in Angelika Fuchs, Horatia Muir Watt, Étienne Pataut (eds), Les conflits de lois et le
système juridique communautaire (Paris, Dalloz, 2004) 205, 224, who suggests a similarity between the
country-of-origin principle and the medieval system of personal laws.
47

See the debate in Friedrich Carl von Savigny, A treatise on the conflict of laws, and the limits of their
operation in respect of place and time 147 (William Guthrie transl, Edinburgh 1869), §§ 350-359.
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norms, territorial or otherwise.48 In other words: translated into a private-internationallaw rule, the content of the country-of-origin principle is hard to justify in the light of
general values held within the field.
2. No Impact at all on Private International Law
The opposite view is that the country-of-origin principle has no impact on private
international law at all. This view, expressed in Article 1(4) of the e-commerce
directive,49 was once nearly unanimously held and is still widespread.50 According to this
view, the country-of-origin principle works on the level of substantive law only; it leaves
the determination of the applicable law to private international law, and only
subsequently controls the application of the law so determined. The law of the countryof-origin is relevant, but not as applicable law. Some argue that EU law requires the
country of destination to create a domestic rule that copies the result of the foreign rule.51
Others denigrate the law of the country-of-origin: “The fact that the trans-border
economic activity conforms to the country-of-origin’s law is a factual element which has
to be taken into account in the application of the host country’s law. The application of
the principle of origin or the principle of mutual recognition does not change the normal
functioning of the conflict rules.“52 The purity of private international law is saved, but
through something of a trick: The undeniable influence that the principle has on the
application of private international law is merely shifted from a question of applicable
law to a question of relevant facts.
3. EU Law as Side-Constraint
Others find middle solutions. According to a third view, developed in particular with
regard to primary EU law, the country-of-origin principles lack the specificity of a
private-international-law norm, but pose constraints on choice of law.53 The country-oforigin principle provides an outer framework that allows for several different private-

48

But see Marc Fallon, “Le principe de proximité dans le droit de l’Union européenne“, in Le droit
international privé: esprit et methodes. Mélanges en l’honneur de Paul Lagarde (Paris, Dallos, 2005) 241,
246 ff.
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Supra n 23 and accompanying text.

50

E.g. de Baere, supra n 24, 297 and passim.
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Holger Altmeppen, “Schutz vor ‘europäischen’ Kapitalgesellschaften“ [2004] Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift 97, 100.
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de Baere, supra n 24, 301 (internal footnote omitted); Michael Wilderspin & Xavier Lewis “Les
relations entre le droit communautaire et les règles de conflits de lois des Etats membres “ (2002) 91 Revue
critique de droit international privé 1, 21.
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Erich Schanze & Andreas Jüttner, “Die Entscheidung für Pluralität: Kollisionsrecht und
Gesellschaftsrecht nach der EuGH-Entscheidung ‘Inspire Art’” [2003] Die Aktiengesellschaft (AG) 661,
665-6; Christiane Wendehorst, “Kollisionsnormen im primären Europarecht?“ in Stefan Lorenz et al (eds),
Festschrift für Andreas Heldrich zum 70. Geburtstag (Munich, Beck 2005) 1071; see also Basedow, supra
n 31, 40-44.
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international-law rules54. EU law does not require member states to adopt a specific
private-international-law rule using the country of origin as connecting factor. If they use
other connecting factors, however, the resulting private-international-law norms are
restricted in their applicability by EU law. The Polish plumber’s contracts can be
governed by English law, unless designation of English law restricts his freedom to
provide services. Obviously, this makes application difficult.
4. EU Law as Internationally Mandatory Law
According to a fourth view, we should not focus so much at all on whether the countryof-origin principle is a private-international-law rule. Rather, we should focus on the
coordinated field of harmonized law and conceptualize this field as a group of
internationally mandatory norms. Since internationally mandatory norms apply
irrespective of private-international-law norms (at least according to one view), these
norms would be applicable not through the designation of a rule of private international
law, but rather because of their self-determined territorial scope of application.55
Although the proponent of this point of view seems to have doubts, admitting it to be
“stretching the line of argument beyond what existing case law would support”56 and
calling it “pharisaic”,57 it has found at least one follower.58 This would mean that the
Service Directive Proposal would turn wide parts of member states’ laws governing
services into “internationally mandatory norms” (though the approach does not say which
parts exactly). Polish law regarding services would apply to the Polish plumber in
England as internationally mandatory norms. (It is not clear why the corresponding
norms of English law would not also be internationally mandatory under this approach,
and how the resulting conflict is to be resolved).
5. EU Law as Functional Equivalent of Private International Law
The fifth and final suggestion is to think of the country-of-origin principle as the
functional equivalent of private international law.59 This view makes use of the fact that
functional equivalence combines sameness and difference – functionally equivalent

54

E.g. Kurt Lipstein, “The Law relating to the movement of companies in the European Community”, in
Festschrift für Erik Jayme I, 527, 529. See also Ansgar Ohly, “Herkunftslandprinzip und Kollisionsrecht“
2001 Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht – Internationaler Teil (GRURInt) 899, 901-2 (arguing
for a “kollisionsrechtlicher Mindestgehalt”, a minimal core of private international law).
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56

Ibid at 222.
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Conflict of Laws” [2005] Global Jurist Topics Vol. 2, Issue 2, Article 2,
http://www.bepress.com/gj/topics/vol5/iss2/art2/, 27-28, 34-36.
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institutions fulfil the same tasks by different means.60 Indeed, the country-of-origin
principle fulfils the same function as private international law, namely the resolution of
problems arising from discrepancies between legal systems, in particular, discrepancies
between the laws of the country of destination and the country-of-origin. It does so,
however, by different means, namely by limiting application of one law so that the result
is in accordance with that of the law of the country of origin, rather than designating that
law as applicable. The clash between traditional private international law and the
country-of-origin principle could thus be described as the clash between functionally
equivalent tools. Functionally, the Polish plumber is governed by (presumably laxer)
Polish law rather than by English law, regardless of the doctrinal way to reach this result.
Of course, functional equivalence alone could not determine which approach is better –
equivalence means, literally, equality of value61 – nor lay out the practical coordination
between the two. For this, other criteria are necessary.
C.

THE NEED FOR A BROADER CONCEPT OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW

These views do not predict or prescribe certain outcomes. Conceptual theories are not
right or wrong (and thus cannot be falsified), nor are they necessarily mutually exclusive.
Rather, they represent different attempts to conceptualize certain realities; they are more
or less adequate conceptualizations of the relationship between EU law and private
international law. Indeed, all views struggle with the same problem. On the one hand, the
country-of-origin principle deals with the same problems as private international law –
the conflict between norms from different legal systems – and it has an undeniable impact
on the process of traditional private law. In this sense, it is clearly part of private
international law understood broadly. On the other hand, the country-of-origin principle
has a structure different from that of traditional private-international-law norms. In this
sense, it certainly cannot be called a private-international-law norm.
The way to resolve this tension is to broaden the concept of private international law.
Scholars who see a difference between the country-of-origin principle and private
international law all have a particular view of private international law in the traditional
European sense – a system of rules designating the applicable law. This view is unduly
narrow, it substitutes one approach for a whole discipline. Obviously, the country-oforigin principle is not private international law in the sense of the currently predominant
approach which determines the applicable law according to the closest connection. But
private international law as a discipline is broader than its current practice, and the field’s
history has shown a remarkable set of approaches that have fallen in and out of fashion.
Indeed, because of this variety of approaches, private international law as a discipline
cannot be defined other than by its function, the function to resolve the conflicts that may
exist between different private law systems. And since the country-of-origin principle

60

Ralf Michaels, “The Functional Method of Comparative Law”, in Reinhard Zimmermann & Mathias
Reimann (eds), Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, 2006) 339.
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Ibid at 374.
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fulfils this very same function, the country-of-origin principle is undeniably itself a
species of private international law, understood functionally.
Once we broaden our understanding of private international law, we can see the different
attempts to conceptualize the relationship between the country-of-origin principle and
private international law discussed before in a new light. In fact, all have their
predecessors in the field’s doctrinal history.
The country-of-origin principle acts only on the level of substantive law and requires the
judge to incorporate rules of the foreign law into his own law or adapt his own law to the
content of foreign law?62 This is compatible with Roberto Ago’s theory of naturalization
of foreign legal rules,63 as well as with Walter Wheeler Cook’s local law theory.64 Such
approaches have been considered unhelpful for reasons that are still valid today: It would
be artificial to distinguish such an approach in principle from private international law,65
and the approach is not helpful in practice, as it gives no guidelines for how the foreign
rules should be reconstructed.66
Foreign law enters the analysis only as a fact?67 This is not so different from what Cook
argued and what Ehrenzweig later developed into an entire private-international-law
theory, the so-called datum theory, in which foreign law enters the analysis as datum, as
fact.68 Again, criticism against this approach is valid today. The distinction between fact
and law is artificial and not helpful; every legal norm is both fact and law.69
The country-of-origin principle is only a side-restraint on private-international-law rules
rather than a proper norm of private international law?70 This is congruent with the idea
of constitutional limitations on private international law as acknowledged, for example,
by the German Constitutional Court in 197171 or by the US Supreme Court.72 Indeed, the
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development of US Constitutional law in the area of private international law shows that
this conceptualization alone does not determine the importance of the principle vis-à-vis
traditional choice of law.73 Whereas the US Constitution today puts virtually no
constraint on choice of law74, there were times when it could be expected to determine
virtually the entire field.75 The argument that the country-of-origin principle is not
sufficiently specific to qualify as a private international law76 norm is not more decisive.
Open-ended concepts of modern private international law like “governmental interests”,
“party expectations”, and the like are hardly more specific.
And, finally, the country-of-origin principle is not a norm of private international law
because the coordinated field functions as a set of internationally mandatory norms that
are outside the ordinary scope of private international law?77 This presumes a narrow
understanding of private international law. Not only can so-called internationally
mandatory norms be accommodated within private international law, as especially Klaus
Schurig has shown.78 Even more importantly, they are part of existing private
international law litigation, as the example of Article 7 of the Rome Contracts
Convention shows.79
II.

THE COUNTRY-OF-ORIGIN PRINCIPLE AS VESTED RIGHTS THEORY

If all existing conceptualizations of the country-of-origin principle already relate to
private international law theories, it appears plausible to argue that we should openly do

the Conflict of Laws”, (1972) 20 American Journal of Comparative Law 290; for a French translation see
(1974) Revue critique de droit international privé 57 with the article by Catherine Labrusse, “Droit
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the same and conceptualize the principle as private international law. But what kind of
private international law? To be adequate, the approach must share those traits that are
characteristic for the country-of-origin principle. It should achieve universality – the law
it designates must be applicable everywhere. It should leave the traditional process of
designating the applicable law intact and only restrict the scope of the otherwise
applicable law, not simply designate the applicable law on its own. The approach should
not be based on the closest connection, since even merely formal connections like the
place of registration suffice for the country-of-origin principle. The approach should
restrict the regulatory power of states and strengthen the rights of individuals. Such an
approach exists: the theory of vested rights.
A. THEORIES OF VESTED RIGHTS

When we think of vested rights today, we usually think of Dicey in England and Beale in
the United States, and we think of their vested rights theory as thoroughly refuted. But
this is a limited picture in two regards. First, just as there is not one country-of-origin
principle but many, there is not one vested rights theory but many.80 Second, the reasons
for the decline of different variants of the theory are sufficiently complex to deserve a
closer analysis.
1. Dicey and Beale: The Separation of Law and Rights
The first to formulate a full-fledged theory of vested rights was A.V. Dicey, master of
both English constitutional law and English private international law.81 Dicey held that
“the Courts, e.g. of England, never in strictness enforce foreign law; when they are said
to do so, they enforce not foreign laws, but rights acquired under foreign laws.”82
Sovereignty precludes courts from applying foreign law; justified individual interests
require them to recognize foreign rights. This separation between the applicable law of
the forum and reference to the country of origin can already be found in a court opinion
from 1775: “Every action here must be tried by the law of England, but the law of

80
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England says that in a variety of circumstances … the law of the country where the cause
of action arose shall govern.”83 Thus, Dicey promulgated the following
General Principle No. I. – Every right which has been acquired under the law of any
civilized country is recognized and (in general) enforced by English courts.84
This general principle is then subject to four exceptions, two of which are relevant here.85
First is the somewhat dubious requirement that rights be “duly” acquired.86 Then there is
the important
Exception II. – English Courts will not enforce a right otherwise duly acquired under
the law of a foreign country, where the enforcement of such right
(1) is inconsistent with the moral rules upheld by English law;
(2) involves the recognition, as regards transactions taking place in England, of any
penal status arising under foreign law, or of any institution or status unknown to
the law of England;
(3) is inconsistent with the policy of English law, or with the maintenance of
English political institutions.87
Dicey’s approach therefore has three relevant elements. First, the applicable law in
English courts is always English law. Second, within English law, courts will enforce
rights acquired under foreign law, provided these rights were duly acquired. Notably, this
principle extends to the enforcement of foreign judgments.88 Third, enforcement of such
rights will be refused even though they have been duly acquired if such enforcement
would be immoral, would enforce foreign penal or tax laws, or would violate British
public policy.
Since this theory seemed at the same time to present a welcome more rational alternative
to the traditional idea of comity as the ground for private international law,89 Joseph
Beale adopted it enthusiastically into the United States.90 Prima facie, Beale’s own
formulation of the doctrine sounds quite similar to that of Dicey: “A right having been
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created by the appropriate law, the recognition of its existence should follow
everywhere.”91 Beale, however, added a stronger emphasis on territoriality in the
application of the vested rights theory. For Dicey, his theory had been a structure rather
than a generator of rules: courts enforced rights acquired under foreign law, but which
law created those rights was not part of the theory. For Beale, on the other hand, vested
rights and territoriality went hand in hand: rights could be acquired only under the law of
the sovereign on whose territory the relevant act took place, and other sovereigns had to
enforce the rights created by that sovereign.
Although Beale is often said to be no more than a successor to Dicey, his vested rights
theory is therefore significantly different from Dicey’s. First, unlike Dicey, Beale thought
that the vested rights theory could actually designate the law granting the rights that were
to be enforced. The reason was that, for him, unlike for Dicey, territoriality was a
necessary element of the theory.92 Second, unlike Dicey, Beale had a solution to the
problem of which law one should look to when a situation involved contacts with more
than one state. Under his theory, the relevant legal order was that in which the last act
necessary for the creation of a right took place. This element leads to a third difference to
Dicey, which becomes clear already in Beale’s early review of Dicey’s treatise:93
Whereas Dicey was interested in determining the “proper” law, Beale did not think such
a value-driven analysis was either appropriate or actually what the courts were doing. The
“last-in-time” approach solved the question with a formal criterion. Altogether, Beale’s
theory was both more extensive and more dogmatic than that of Dicey.
However, these differences are outweighed by the similarities between both approaches.
Both authors argued that the conflict of laws does not deal with applying foreign law, but
rather with enforcing rights acquired under foreign law, and both authors saw room for a
limited exception for the public policy of the forum.
2. Pillet and Niboyet: Choice of Law and Enforcement of Rights
This idea of vested rights was not confined to England. Not long after Holland had
introduced it to English conflict of laws (and a translation of his text had appeared in
France94), Antoine Pillet and J.-P. Niboyet developed a French version of the theory that
was distinct in important ways.95 In Pillet’s view, private international law deals with
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three discrete questions: the rights of foreigners, the designation of the applicable law,
and determination of the effect of rights acquired abroad – droits acquis.96 For the second
question, designation of the applicable law, he developed an early version of interest
analysis that predated similar developments in the US by several decades.97 The third
question, the enforcement of rights acquired abroad, is not only a separate inquiry; in
fact, both areas are diametrically opposed:98 The designation of the applicable law
describes a possible conflict of laws, or at least a doubt about which of two or more laws
is applicable. By contrast, the enforcement of vested rights addresses not a conflict
between legal orders as to which can create a right, but merely the question as to the
effect of a right in a country other than that which created it.99 The question is not, in
other words, which of two legal orders is entitled to create (or not create) rights, but
rather whether one country has to recognize rights that already exist because they have
already been created, albeit under the law of another country. Like Dicey, Pillet argued
that the enforcement of foreign rights is different from the question of applicable law.100
Like Dicey, Pillet restricted the duty to enforce foreign rights to duly acquired rights,
“droits acquis régulièrement”. And like Dicey, he extended his theory to the recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments.101 The important difference from Dicey (and
Beale) is that Pillet created a full system of designating the applicable law in addition to
his theory of vested rights. In fact, Pillet considered a right duly acquired only under the
law applicable according to general private international law.
Pillet’s disciples continued adherence to his theory, but with important modifications.
Thus, Niboyet renamed the approach, less elegantly, “the problem of international
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effectiveness of definitely constituted rights,102 to avoid the impression that rights could
somehow exist prior to the law. Even more importantly, he rejected Pillet’s concept of
international law as the basis for a duty to enforce. For him, the theory was much more
modest: a sovereign should know the effectiveness of a right under foreign law in order
to draw, under his own law, the appropriate consequences.103 The duty to enforce foreign
rights was no longer a legal duty, but only a moral duty.104 Although Niboyet was one of
the firmest defenders of the vested rights theory, at the same time he took away its purely
legal character.
3. Cocceji and Tittmann: Rights and Sovereigns in Ius Gentium
If the theory of vested rights may appear to have been created around the end of the 19th
and the beginning of the 20th century.105 this impression is wrong. In fact, theories of
vested rights, of iura quaesita, are much older106. One example can be found in the work
of the German Scholar Heinrich Cocceji. Generally, Cocceji defended a conception of
private international law close to that of Ulric Huber, based on considerations of
territoriality and sovereignty.107 However, embedded within this theory is a formulation
of a theory of vested rights:
For just as it follows from both divine law and the law of peoples that everyone must
obey [the sovereign] to whom he is a subject, and must observe his laws in his acts; so
it follows from that same law of peoples that a right acquired from that observation is
valid everywhere, and can be taken away by no one.108
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The formulation closely mirrors the third of Ulrich Huber’s famous three axioms.109Yet
while Huber, speaking of “iura”, probably refers to laws,110 Cocceji clearly speaks about
individual rights.111 The core of Cocceji’s approach is the same as that for Dicey and
Pillet: rights granted by the law of one country are valid and enforceable in every other
country. Again, the question is not one of what law applies, but rather one of the
enforcement of rights. Cocceji, however, brings a new justification for his theory. The
first step in this justification is vertical reciprocity between the individual and the ruler:
Because individuals must shoulder the burdens of their rulers’ laws, they should also
enjoy the benefits from these laws. What looks like a purely domestic argument
describing the reciprocal relationship between one sovereign and its subjects becomes an
argument for private international law by means of a second step: the quid pro quo exists
not only between the individual and his own ruler but between the individual and all
sovereigns. In other words, there is a link between the facts that an individual is regulated
by his ruler, and that another sovereign cannot subject the individual to additional
regulation if this implies taking away rights granted by his ruler. And why should a
foreign sovereign have to respect a right he has not granted? For Cocceji, this obligation
follows from ius gentium, understood not as the law between nations but as the law
common to all nations.112 The acquired right is binding on all sovereigns not because the
sovereign who granted it had power over other sovereigns in any way, but because ius
gentium requires the general protection of rights.
Cocceji may not yet have formulated a full theory of vested rights.113 Such a theory
appeared later in a dissertation by Friedrich Wilhelm Tittmann.114 Tittmann’s argument,
in essence, is as follows: States must recognize acquired rights, including rights acquired
under foreign laws. This does not create sovereignty concerns because rights are facts, so
sovereignty concerns are irrelevant. Only as a consequence of this duty to enforce rights
acquired under foreign law is there a duty to apply these foreign laws. Indeed, the basis
for enforcement is respect not for the foreign legal order, but rather for the individual that
has acquired this right. Although Tittmann’s book was not influential, the ideas he
109
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formulated must have been in tune with scholarly thinking of his time. The idea that to
deny a person the enforcement of rights she has acquired under foreign law would be a
violation of her personality rights reappears in the work of other authors proposing
theories of vested rights, including Georg Puchta and Ferdinand Lassalle.115
4. US Constitution: Full Faith and Credit and Due Process
Such considerations – that of an obligation to recognize private rights and that of a
superior law like ius gentium as basis for this obligation– are mirrored centuries later in
case law of the US Supreme Court on the limits set by the US Constitution on private
international law. Of particular relevance is the due process clause, which mandates, in
essence, that certain rights (vested rights) may not be taken away without due process of
law.116 For some time, the Court seemed all but willing to constitutionalize the vested
rights theory based on the due process clause. For example, the Court held in 1930 that a
Texas state court was barred from applying Texas law to a contract entered into in
Mexico because Texas could not affect “the rights of parties beyond its borders having no
relation to anything done or to be done within them.”117 Clearly this was about the
protection of rights rather than about the duty to apply foreign law. This duty to apply
foreign law was inferred from another provision of the Constitution, the full faith and
credit clause.118 In the 1930s, therefore, constitutional constraints on private international
law in the US consisted of two separate strands – one regarding the enforcement of rights
acquired abroad, the other regarding the application of foreign law.
Later developments severely weakened both the clarity and the scope of these
constitutional bases for a conflict of laws principle in the US. First, the due process
clause cases were reinterpreted. Their ratio decidendi was no longer seen to be in the
enforcement of rights, but rather in a required connection between the facts and the law
applied.119 Since such a connection was also the relevant element for the full faith and
credit clause, both approaches were combined into one, requiring, eclectically, “a
significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that
choice of [that forum’s] law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”120 Second, the
115
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Court severely reduced the threshold for such contacts, all but abandoning any
constitutional limitation on choice of law.121 This reinterpretation of the due process
clause thus led to the demise of a constitutional vested rights theory122.
B. SIMILARITIES WITH THE COUNTRY-OF-ORIGIN PRINCIPLE

Vested rights theories may thus be varied, but they all share certain core elements.
Importantly, these core elements can all be shown to exist in the country-of-origin
principle as well.
1. Terminology
The first parallel between these theories of vested rights and the country-of-origin
principle is linguistic. Notably, the first occurrence of a country-of-origin principle takes
place in an important English decision on private international law: “Being entertained in
an English Court, [the question] must be adjudicated according to the principles of
English law, applicable to such a case. But the only principle applicable to such a case by
the laws of England is, that the validity of Miss Gordon’s marriage rights must be tried
by reference to the law of the country, where, if they exist at all, they had their origin.”123
Even if great weight should not be assigned to this linguistic parallel between private
international law and the country-of-origin principle, it suggests at least that the thought
patterns underlying jurisprudence about vested rights and the country-of-origin principle
are not altogether dissimilar. The idea that the rights have an origin distinct from their
enforcement in the courts is a centrepiece of both the vested rights theory and the country
of origin principle.
2. Universality
Another similarity between the country-of-origin principle and vested rights is relevant –
universality. Under the vested rights theory, a right acquired (and valid) under one law
must be considered valid in all other countries.124 This parallels the policy behind the
country-of-origin principle to subject a provider to only one set of norms, regardless of
where he becomes active. Of course, many approaches to private international law aim at
such universality, including the traditional Savignyan approach that underlies the
European regulations. However, not every conflict of laws theory aims at universality in
this sense. Currie’s interest analysis with its strong preference for the application of
forum law, for example, is not such a theory.
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3. Separation from Applicable Law
In another regard, the country-of-origin principle is more like the vested rights theory
than a Savignyan system. The country-of-origin principle does not determine an
applicable law. It operates separately from the designation of the applicable law,
intervening only once the applicable law has been determined through a traditional
choice-of-law analysis. This separation between two operations is hard to conceptualize
within Savignyan private international law; it has led many to conclude that EU law is
different from choice of law altogether.125 By contrast, exactly the same separation is
apparent in the vested rights theory. Frequently, foreign rights are deemed facts, not law,
so they do not interfere with the determination of the applicable law.126 Pillet designed
his system of acquired rights alongside and even in opposition to a general system of
conflict of laws. Even Dicey’s claim that English courts will always apply English law
can be characterized as a (very simple) conflicts rule that always designates the law of the
forum as the generally applicable law. The vested rights theory then, for Dicey, operates
outside this general rule, as it does for Pillet. Similarly, for Cocceji, the concept that one
sovereign has to respect the rights granted by another sovereign is only one part of his
approach to private international law; the other part covers the relationship between
sovereigns.127 At least for some authors, then, the vested rights theory leaves intact a
system that designates the applicable laws. This makes the vested rights theory a better
candidate for a reconceptualization of the country-of-origin principle than Savignyan
private international law.
4. Regulations, Rights and Privileges
One apparent difference lies in the fact that the country-of-origin principle focuses not on
rights but rather on freedom from restrictions. Is the country-of-origin principle really
about rights? Does it not, rather, encompass a multitude of possible legal positions, many
of which are in fact better characterized as privileges and liberties than as rights – the
privilege to provide services, for example? Under a vested rights approach à la Beale,
English, not Polish law would apply to contracts the Polish plumber would enter into in
England; English law would apply to torts he would commit there. But the vested rights
theory is not defined by territoriality, nor is it restricted to rights. In fact, the apparent
difference highlights a similarity. On the one hand, early predecessor theories of the
country-of-origin principle also focused, not surprisingly, on privileges rather than rights.
Cities often granted merchant privileges to foreign merchants; Since these privileges
grew into acquired rights, they could not be withdrawn.128 On the other hand, the 19th
century notion of rights that underlies Holland’s work on jurisprudence and thereby also,
if indirectly, Dicey’s and Beale’s work on private international law, is broader than the
125
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current notion would be. All law was thought to consist of rights; privileges and liberties
(in Hohfeldian terminology) were thereby included.129 The correct translation would be
as follows: the Polish plumber, by complying with Polish law, acquires a privilege to
provide services which he can hold against any requirements in other member states.
At the same time, this distinction between rights and privileges suggests a weakness, and
indeed the history of the vested rights theory illustrates the limits of a country-of-origin
principle. The theory worked well regarding clearly defined privileges that were
explicitly granted by a sovereign. It still works well in the area of enforcement of foreign
judgments, which both Dicey and Pillet included in their theories of vested rights. It
works far less well, however, as a general theory of private international law because of
the question when and what rights are actually granted in the first place. Similar problems
arise with the country-of-origin principle in the realm of private law. The principle is
created predominantly with administrative (sovereign) processes in mind that can easily
be compared to the granting of privileges in city states. The principle works far less well,
at least for the solution of specific problems, in the area of private international law,
where no formal “granting” process can be observed, and thus both existence and scope
of liberties are unclear. As long as the Polish plumber does not receive a formal Polish
privilege, the extent to which English law cannot be applied to him is hard to determine.
5. „Günstigkeitsprinzip“
One problem of conceptualizing the country-of-origin principle as a traditional privateinternational-law rule is that the country of destination is not obliged to apply the laws of
the country-of-origin, but only prohibited from posing additional barriers. If an activity is
illegal under the law of the country of origin, the country of destination is free to validate
the activity under its own, more liberal law. This is what led Basedow to conceptualize
the country-of-origin principle as a Günstigkeitsprinzip, the application of the more
favourable of the two laws.130 The vested rights theory provides a more elegant
conceptualization.131 This is not true for its stronger version, which submits both the
creation and the denial of rights to a certain legal order. For Beale, the country in whose
territory the last act took place had the exclusive power to determine whether a right had
been acquired. The US Supreme Court has held similarly.132 Even Cocceji seems to argue
this in his example of a testator who writes a will in the form prescribed by the law of his
domicile, but not admissible under the law of the place where he writes the will.133 This
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will is invalid not only under the lex loci but also under the lex domicilii, because the
domicile cannot create rights outside its boundaries. But insofar as these theories deal
also with the non-creation of rights, they lose their character of “pure” vested rights
theories. This part must be explained by other factors, most importantly territoriality.
A vested rights theory confined to the enforcement of rights is in perfect congruence with
a country-of-origin principle. Both ensure that positions acquired under one law cannot
be taken away by another law. Both are silent regarding the opposite question whether
restrictions imposed by one law must be enforced by another law. A Günstigkeitsprinzip
is compatible with a vested rights theory that is confined to the creation of rights or
privileges. Although states are required to recognize the rights already vested in a person,
they are not prevented from assigning additional rights to that person. The Polish plumber
can rely on his Polish privilege against stricter English law; where English law is less
strict than the requirements for this privilege, he is free to rely on it.
6. Mandatory Requirements of Public Interest and Public Policy Exception
The vested rights theory and the country-of-origin principle match perfectly regarding
another aspect, the public policy exception. The European Court of Justice provided such
an exception already in its Cassis de Dijon decision, excepting “mandatory requirements
of public interest” from a country-of-origin principle.134 Since then, the Court has
developed an elaborate system of exceptions to the principle of mutual recognition.
Similarly, the country-of-origin principle, as stated in directives, allows for exceptions for
public policy not only outside the coordinated field, but even within it. This accords with
the public policy exceptions formulated by proponents of vested rights theories. Dicey
saw an exception for foreign rights inconsistent with the moral rules or the policy upheld
by English law;135 Beale’s theory provided for a (limited) public policy exception, and
Pillet allowed for the non-enforcement of foreign rights that violated French public
policy.
Critics consider these public policy exceptions incompatible with a private-internationallaw concept of the country-of-origin principle.136 They are in good company with critics
of the vested rights theory who considered the public policy exception an unwarranted
denial of the vested rights theory. Both groups of critics ignore the particular structure of
the theories they criticize. Even if the creation of rights is recognized, enforcement of
these rights can be made subject to requirements of public policy just as the enforcement
of domestic rights is. This is perfectly compatible with a public policy exception to the
country-of-origin principle.
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7. The Common Market and the Circle of Civilized Nations
A final similarity is illuminating. The country-of-origin principle is confined to EU
member states. There is no worldwide country-of-origin principle (although the proposal
has been made to extend the concept from the e-commerce directive to worldwide
application).137 The limitation has three connected reasons. First, the common market is a
specific goal of the European Communities. There are no similar goals on a global level,
at least to the same degree. Second, the member states of the EU share a common history
and a common culture; their legal systems are not likely to be dramatically different from
the start. Third, the similarity, or at least the equivalence, of different legal systems is
actively pursued by the EU. This connection between equivalence and the country-oforigin principle can be seen most clearly in the area of the directives. Harmonization
takes place within a “coordinated field”, and the country-of-origin principle is then
confined to these coordinated fields.
The vested rights theory includes a similar restriction based on similar reasoning. Dicey
limited his theory to rights acquired under the laws of “civilized countries”, with words
that could come from a textbook on harmonization and mutual recognition in the EU:
“the willingness of one State to give effect to rights gained under the laws of other States
depends upon the existence of a similarity in principle between the legal and moral
notions prevailing among different communities.”138 Similarly, Niboyet invoked the
“circle of civilized nations”.139 This community of civilized nations is replicated in the
member states of the European Union. International law (once likewise limited to
“civilized nations”,140 as Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice still suggests) provided a framework for the obligation to enforce foreign rights
like the EC Treaty does today.
III. CRITICISM OF VESTED RIGHTS THEORIES AND THE COUNTRY-OF-ORIGIN
PRINCIPLE

That the country-of-origin principle is similar in significant respects to the vested rights
theory is not only important for the heuristics of European law; in addition, it suggests a
serious challenge. The vested rights theory in private international law has been
thoroughly discarded. Does this make the country-of-origin principle untenable, too? If
the arguments for its refutation applied similarly to the country-of-origin principle, this
would be an important and far-reaching lesson for EU law from private international law.
However, it can be shown that this is not the case – the country-of-origin principle can
refute most of the criticism brought against the vested rights theory. This has implications
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for the contingency of arguments in private international law and for the peculiarities of
private international law in the European Union.
A. CRITICISM OF THE COUNTRY-OF-ORIGIN PRINCIPLE AND OF VESTED
RIGHTS

The vested rights theory has had to yield to devastating criticism in every country where
it was once supported. The first crucial attack occurred as early as 1842 in Carl Georg
Wächter’s important article on private international law,141 long before Dicey, Beale, and
Pillet constructed their theories. Wächter’s arguments and their subsequent approval by
Savigny142 ensured that the theory of vested rights never became strong in Germany. In
the United States, where the vested rights theory had achieved canonic status as the basis
for the first restatement of conflict of laws, a similarly devastating criticism was voiced
especially by Walter Wheeler Cook.143 That the vested rights theory is now all but dead
in France144 is due to the forceful criticism by Arminjon,145 In England, the theory’s death
was more peaceful but no less complete. After Dicey’s death, one of the authors to
replace him, Kurt Lipstein, changed General Principle I by replacing „duly acquired“
with „acquired ... according to the English rules of conflict of laws“,146 This brought
Dicey in line with Pillet while at the same time opening him to the same criticism voiced
by Arminjon – namely, that the theory was superfluous.147 Indeed, in 1971 Morris could
safely proclaim that „the vested rights theory is dead“.148 Conflict of laws as conflict of
norms had effectively won the day.
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The country-of-origin principle, by contrast, is extant—and vitally so. Its deletion from
the services directive was due to the political climate of the moment and is unlikely to be
permanent This survival is prima facie surprising, since the principle has engendered an
amount of criticism nearly equalling that brought earlier against the vested rights theory.
Moreover, nolens volens, the criticism that private-international-law scholars voice today
against the country-of-origin principle mirrors the criticism brought earlier against the
vested rights theory.
1. The Need to Determine the Applicable Law
One criticism of the country-of-origin principle is its unclear relationship with private
international law. Regardless of Article 1(4) of the e-commerce Directive, some authors
state that the country-of-origin principle “really” is a conflicts rule, regardless of what it
sets out to be.149 Although the country-of-origin principle is presented as an alternative to
a system designating the applicable law, it is necessary both to determine the relevant
legal order, through the connecting factor of “origin”, and to look to its legal provisions
in order to determine whether a provider complies with the rules.
Similar criticism has been voiced against the claim of the vested rights theory,
challenging the claim that the enforcement of rights avoids the need to apply foreign law.
Both Dicey and Pillet had conceived theories of vested rights as an alternative to a system
designating the applicable law. Dicey thought he could avoid the problem of applying
foreign law altogether; Pillet thought he could do the same for at least some situations.
Critics have pointed out that both hopes were illusory, for determining whether a right
had been “duly acquired”, “régulièrement acquis” requires determining the legal order
that allegedly created it. For Dicey’s theory this meant that, despite his argument to the
contrary, the enforcement of foreign rights implied, necessarily, the designation and
application of foreign law.150 Pillet’s theory, it has been argued, works well only when, at
the time when the right is created, contacts to only one country exist.151 At the same time,
the theory is unnecessary for such situations because their resolution is obvious152. If,
however, contacts to more than one country exist, one has to decide which of these
countries’ laws should govern the creation of the right; then the process of enforcing
foreign rights is no longer distinct from the process of designating the applicable law.153
In short, the vested rights theory is nothing more than a misnomer for a theory that, like
other theories, seeks to determine the law applicable to a transaction. The focus on rights
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is wrong, because rights are a fiction.154 In reality, the enforcement of foreign rights
necessarily implies the application of foreign law.155
2. Circularity
In Centros, the Court of Justice held that a company that has been validly created under
the rule of one member state must be recognized by other member states. Critics have
pointed to the circularity of this argument. Whether a company has been created validly
under a certain law cannot be determined before that law has been found to be applicable
in the first place. It is for the private international law norms of other countries, not for
the country of origin itself, to determine the scope of its laws.
This circularity argument is well-known from the debate over the vested rights theory,
pointing to its circularity.156 A U.S. District Court formulated this criticism accurately in
1950: „It is of no great help to say that the rights cannot be changed because they are
‚vested’, for by ‚vested’ we mean essentially that we will not allow them to be
changed.“.157 This criticism is more than one hundred years older. Frequently, Savigny is
credited with its first formulation: „This principle leads into a complete circle; for we can
only know what are vested rights if we know beforehand by what local law we are to
decide as to their complete acquisition.“158 But the first author to formulate the criticism
was Wächter: "Anyway to decide the question whether our judge must decide, in certain
cases, according to foreign laws, on the basis that he must protect duly acquired rights,
probably rests on a petitio principii. If, in the matter of a legal relation established abroad,
one wishes to claim for a right acquired under foreign law absolute protection also within
one’s own country, one argues from a premise that has still to be proved, namely, that
this legal relation is to be judged according to foreign, and not domestic, laws.”159
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Another way to put the argument is that the theory is inconclusive. It is a plausible liberal
argument against the retroactive application of laws that if state A has granted a right,
state A cannot take the right away again. In fact, this was the political basis for a
domestic version of the vested rights approach. But it simply does not follow that state B
is under a similar obligation with regard to rights granted by state A. Translated into the
EU context, England may be bound by its liberal rules for the creation of companies, but
it does not follow that Denmark is similarly bound by them.
3. Indeterminacy
There is another problem with the country-of-origin principle. It is all well and good to
give the country of origin exclusive regulatory competence, but this principle cannot
determine which country qualifies as country of origin in the first place. This question is
easy to answer when administrative actions, like registration, take place. It becomes
much harder in the area of private law, in which mere factual connections matter
The vested rights theory had to deal with a similar criticism: it cannot determine which
legal order grants rights because laws cannot determine their own applicability.160 To be
complete, the vested rights theory requires an addition – namely, a criterion to determine
which legal order is competent to grant rights. Two responses can be given. The first is
Dicey’s. Dicey admitted that his theory could not deliver this criterion.161 At the same
time, however, he did not think that this was a grave shortcoming. Whenever a legal
system grants a right, he argued, there should be an assumption that this right was “duly”
acquired and is therefore enforceable. This suggests a shift to a unilateral method.162 The
second response is to combine the vested rights concept with a criterion that determines
the competent legal order. Beale and Pillet both chose this second response, albeit in
different ways. For Beale, the necessary criterion was territoriality, based on his
preference for a territorial understanding of the law in general. For Pillet, the necessary
criterion followed from the application of general rules of private international law. We
see that territoriality, which critics have often deemed a necessary element of vested
rights theories,163 is but one of various connecting factors compatible with the theory.
Both responses have weaknesses. The unilateral approach advocated by Dicey works well
when the creation of rights is based on a formal act that is clearly recognizable—for
example, the rendering of a judicial decision. Yet whether a legal order creates a right
without such a formal act is often hard to determine. Coupling the vested rights theory to
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an additional criterion as Beale and Pillet do weakens its explanatory power. Beale’s
strong emphasis on territoriality has given way to much criticism because this criterion
was considered simplistic.164 Pillet’s idea to determine the legal order competent to create
rights with regard to the generally applicable law makes his vested rights theory
redundant: since that order’s law is applicable anyway, the notion of vested rights does
not yield any additional analytical purchase.165 However, this criticism only points to the
theory’s inconclusiveness without proving it wrong.
4. Insufficiency
Another criticism of the country-of-origin principle points to its insufficiency. As a
general approach, the principle would designate the country-of-origin’s law as
exclusively applicable. Since this is not the scope of the principle, regulatory gaps may
occur. In its stricter version, the principle requires the institutions of the country of origin
to regulate exclusively. For various reasons, these institutions may be disinclined to
regulate, so underregulation is not unlikely.166 The fear of the Polish plumber is spurred
by the vision that Poland will not care about high standards for plumbers as long as most
plumbers cause harm in other member states. If the principle is non-exclusive, this leaves
the question of the otherwise applicable law open, if such a restriction is found to exist.167
Again, this criticism mirrors one voiced earlier against the vested rights theory. In fact,
we find an early version already in Wächter’s 1842 article: The theory of vested rights is
insufficient. Even if it can explain why a court must refer to foreign law regarding the
creation of a right, it cannot explain why a court must do the same regarding the noncreation of a right.168 Like with the country-of-origin principle, there are two kinds of
vested rights theories in this respect – one exclusive, the other non-exclusive – , and the
criticism applies differently to each of them. Those theories that refer to foreign law for
the non-creation of rights as well as for the creation of rights cannot be based only on a
theory of vested rights; rather, they replace ordinary private-international-law methods
with some other method—for example, Beale’s territoriality method. However, those
theories that refer to foreign law only for the creation of rights are necessarily
incomplete. They require an additional set of norms to determine the law applicable to
issues other than the creation of rights – be it forum law, as in Dicey’s theory, or a law
determined otherwise, as in Pillet’s theory.
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5. Formalism
The country-of-origin principle, critics hold, emphasizes merely formal connecting
factors over substantive connections. For example, the Court of Justice in Centros
obliged Denmark to recognize a company as English although, indisputably, all relevant
connections pointed to Denmark: the company had been set up by two Danes for their
Danish business, the only contact to England, apart from the registration, was the formal
address for the company at a friend’s place. Similarly, the country-of-origin principle in
the Services Directive might enable providers to establish a formal home in a member
state with low regulation, although his economic interest would lie entirely in the country
of destination.
Obviously, this mirrors the criticism against the vested rights theory. In a classic
American casebook opinion,169 an Alabama court applied the law of Tennessee to a tort
claim following a railway accident, although all connections except for the place of the
accident – plaintiff’s and defendant’s domicile, their employment contract, the
defendant’s alleged negligence – all led to Alabama. Thus, although Alabama had both
the much greater regulatory interest and the closer connection, Tennessee law was
applied on the purely formal basis that the plaintiff’s right, if any, had been vested in
Tennessee when the last event necessary for its creation, the injury, had occurred there.
6. Policies
The final argument may be the most important one. This is the policy argument, directed
against the requirement of both the vested rights theory and the country-of-origin
principle that states must give up part of their sovereignty to private rights and private
parties. Mankowski makes exactly this argument against restrictions of regulatory laws of
the country of destination when he argues, against the country-of-origin principle for
competition law: “This is an eminently political decision. Every state must take this
decision for itself and for its own market”.170 Wächter expressly invoked the same
argument against the vested rights theory: “In any event, the legislator of a foreign state
can easily recognize rights which are completely opposed to the moral and religious
principles, the notions of law and justice and the requirements of public policy, the
security of transactions and the care for the citizens’ economic well being, on which our
state’s legislation is founded. Shall now our state have to recognize and protect such
rights, e.g. slavery, right to usurious interest rates, to debts from gaming etc., if and
because they were duly acquired in that foreign state under its laws?”171
The criticism based on policy rests on three different considerations. The first goes to the
relationship between two countries and the allocation of regulatory power between them.
Should a rule point to the affected legal order or to the country of origin? The affected
legal order may, of course, be determined in different ways. For Mankowski, it is the
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affected market; for Wächter, it was the forum; for traditional private law of torts it is the
place of the injury. Nonetheless, these critics agree that the country of origin, or the
country under whose law a right is created, is frequently not necessarily the country with
the closest connection or the country that is otherwise the most appropriate for regulation.
England, not Poland, cares about the regulations for plumbers working in England,
regardless of whether they are Polish, English, or from anywhere else.
The second consideration in the policy-based criticism concerns not the relationship
between countries so much as the relationship between the state and the individual.
Critics of the country-of-origin principle point to a vital state interest in protecting the
(social) welfare of its own citizens against the individual interests of suppliers; they
oppose what they see as an undue emphasis on market liberalism over the social welfare
state. The Polish plumber, so the argument goes, will create a race to the bottom –
English plumbers cannot compete unless standards under English law are lowered to the
level of Polish law. This creates a notable parallel to the vested rights theory that was
born as a classical liberal theory of private international law – it protects rights that have
been granted by one state against all other states. This is obvious in the due process
clause of the US Constitution, but similar considerations can be found in other
formulations of the theory. One of Pillet’s disciples, Bernard, justified the theory of droits
acquis not with the mutual respect between sovereigns, but rather with the respect due to
private rights.172 The heyday of vested rights theories in the 19th century coincides with
the heyday of political liberalism.173 Likewise, their demise in the 20th century coincides
with the rise of the welfare state. 20th century critics of the vested rights theory see the
judge’s task as finding a good solution for the common good, rather than protecting
individual rights and thereby overlooking the common good.
The third policy consideration concerns the relationship between the parties. Both the
vested rights theory and the country-of-origin principle favour one party over the other on
the basis of abstract criteria. This has spurred criticism against both. As regards the
country-of-origin principle, critics ask why suppliers should be preferred to recipients of
services.174 As regards the vested rights theory, Kropholler asks a structurally similar
question: Why should the creditor (who invokes his right) be preferred to the debtor (who
can only invoke his liberty).175 Indeed, this criticism of both is particularly apt in
consumer law (to which currently no country-of-origin principle is applied). Traditional
private international law protects the passive consumer against the active supplier – if a
consumer is contacted in his home state by an out-of-state supplier, he can rely on the
application of his home law. The country-of-origin principle, like the vested rights
theory, would rather protect the supplier, although – thus the criticism – it should be
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easier for the supplier, as the moving party, than for the consumer to comply with foreign
law.
B. THE COUNTRY-OF-ORIGIN PRINCIPLE CAN REFUTE THE CRITICISM

These five bases for criticism were enough to bring the vested rights theory down. The
theory was rejected because it did not dispense with the need to determine the applicable
law, it was circular, indeterminate and insufficient, and its underlying policy was
rejected. However, although the same bases have been brought forward against the
country-of-origin principle, they have not had similar success. Indeed, it can be shown
one by one how the country-of-origin principle can refute the criticism. The main
structural reason lies in the differences between the international legal scene of the vested
rights theory and that of the EU with its country-of-origin principle. The main policy
reason lies in the renewed force of liberal positions.
1. The Need to Determine the Applicable Law
What, first, of the criticism that the vested rights theory does not make irrelevant the
determination of the law applicable to its creation? This criticism has always been
somewhat misdirected. It is of course true that such a determination is a necessary
element of the vested rights theory. The important point of the vested rights theory is not
that it makes determination of the applicable law irrelevant, but rather that it does not
make it the only element of private international law. The point is that if a right has been
created according to one legal system competent to do so, and that right need only be
enforced, this enforcement can be separated from the creation of the right and can be
governed by a different law, as long as that law does not clash with the right itself.
The same is true, and perhaps more forcefully so, for the country-of-origin principle,
which is not designed as a method to determine the applicable law. True, the judge must
still first determine what the provider’s country-of-origin is and whether the provider has
complied with that country’s law. This requires her to determine both what the country of
origin is and what its law is. The point is that services rendered by the provider can still
be governed by the law of the country of destination, as long as that law does not clash
with the privileges provided by the country of origin.
2. Circularity
The argument of circularity rests on the assumption that states retain mutual sovereignty
and that the enforcement of foreign rights is a matter for sovereignty. If a superior set of
norms can be found that restricts sovereignty and that requires states to recognize vested
rights, the circularity claim falls apart, since then the duty to enforce these rights no
longer arises from the foreign law that created them but rather from this superior norm
whose binding force is beyond doubt. Critics have been all too ready to adopt Wächter’s
criticism of circularity without realizing that, unlike Wächter, most authors proposing a
more elaborate version of a vested rights theory assume the existence of such a higher set
of norms:176 natural law,177 ius gentium178, general common law,179 customary
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international law,180 or simply a legally relevant principle of justice.181 Within a federal
system like the US – or a Treaty based community of states like the EU – a constitution
or a Treaty can easily furnish this set of norms. Indeed, even Wächter himself admitted as
much. Normally presented as the staunchest opponent of the vested rights theory, he
accepted the theory’s validity regarding the relationship as between the different states
within the German empire.182
This suggests that the circularity argument is intrinsically linked to an idea about state
sovereignty. This is why the criticism of circularity, so fatal with regard to the vested
rights theory in private international law, loses its force with regard to the country-oforigin principle of European law. There is no doubt that EU law, both as primary law (in
particular, the basic freedoms) and as secondary law (in particular, the directives based
on the country-of-origin principle) is a superior set of norms.183 The country of origin
provides only the laws with which a provider must comply; the obligation for all other
states to recognize the results of such compliance rests not on those laws but rather on a
superior set of norms. That England must accept a Polish plumber under Polish law is a
consequence not of Polish law per se, but of both countries’ membership in the EU and
the ceding of parts of national sovereignty that comes with it. The restriction of
sovereignty within the European Union weakens the circularity argument.
3. Indeterminacy
The indeterminacy criticism – that the vested rights theory cannot provide criteria for
determining the applicable law – is harder to refute; it has some force against the countryof-origin principle, as well. That principle alone cannot determine what counts as the
country of origin; other criteria must be found. Indeed, if the word “origin” is meant to
conceal the fact that the choice of what counts as the country of origin is an actual
political choice, the criticism is as strong here as against the vested rights theory. Why,
for example, is the supplier’s rather than the user’s state considered as the “country of
origin”? Basedow’s own argument for favouring the supplier is that suppliers act as
motors of European integration.184 The counterargument brought by others is that the
costs saved by suppliers are merely shifted to the users of services, so no efficiency gain
is achieved.185 Both positions are different proposals for what should count as a
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connecting factor—both being based on considerations of the European market. None of
them is deduced from the notion of country of origin alone.
This suggests that the country-of-origin principle, like the vested rights theory, requires
an additional method to determine which country should count as the country of origin.
However, it suggests that such a method can be developed on the basis of the idea of the
common market. Like the vested rights theory, the country-of-origin principle is
indeterminate, but not intrinsically incoherent.
4. Insufficiency
What about the insufficiency argument that the country-of-origin principle cannot answer
all questions as to what is the applicable law? It is indeed the case that the country-oforigin principle makes only rights, not liabilities and other restrictions binding. However,
the reason for this limitation is that the impetus behind the principle is to restrict barriers
to trade in the form of legal relations, not to create legal regimes. Just as rights function
as trumps over the objective law, to use Ronald Dworkin’s language,186 so the country of
origin functions as a trump over the objective law, while leaving it intact in general.
Properly understood, the country-of-origin principle enables a slight but important
reformulation of the Günstigkeitsprinzip. The relationship between the country-of-origin
law and the otherwise applicable law is not the relation between two different legal
systems, where the law’s applicability is alternative: that of one system or the other.
Rather, the relationship is a combination of a right, granted by the law of the country of
origin, and a set of laws—those of the country of destination. The country-of-origin
principle and traditional private international law together determine both the applicable
law and its treatment of certain rights. The Polish plumber has a privilege under Polish
law that he can hold against requirements of English law, but the law applicable to his
conduct remains English law. Substituting the country-of-origin principle for a traditional
private international law rule designating the applicable law would thus go beyond what
the common market requires and in fact beyond what makes sense in a common market.
The restriction of the country-of-origin principle to limited questions of rights to provide
services is an advantage rather than a disadvantage.
5. Formalism
The characterization of the country-of-origin principle as formal is apt. However, as
criticism this characterization is less successful than it was against the vested rights
theory. There are several reasons for this. First, we are currently observing a revived
preference for formal over substantive connecting factors in the law. The reason given is
that formal rules are easier for parties to predict, and party expectations are considered
more important than the regulatory interests of states. Second, formal factors, because
they are easier to manipulate, enable parties to choose the laws applicable to them
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indirectly and may thereby further regulatory competition between member state laws as
a path towards more efficient laws.187 One may of course oppose these policies that are
used to justify the formalism of the country-of-origin principle in the same way in which
the formalism of the vested rights theory was criticized by legal realists hoping for
stronger government. But such criticism shifts the debate from one over form to one over
substance.
However, just as with the vested rights theory before, the alleged predictability and ease
of administration have limits. Where the county of origin can be determined easily, as
with the registration of a company, predictability both as to that country and to the scope
of applicable law can indeed be achieved. Where on the other hand no such formal act
takes place, predictability is much harder to achieve. The Services Directive, to use one
example, would have left a huge scope for debate as to the scope of its country-of-origin
principle. Would the Polish plumber’s contractual liability be governed by Polish law?
Would his tort liability for damage to property be governed by Polish law?188 Would
persons not privy to the contracts he enters into suddenly be confronted with Polish law
and standards? Numerous such questions would arise.
6. Policies
The above discussion has already suggested that, since the logical and structural
arguments are ultimately not fatal for the country-of-origin principle, the policy
arguments become the most important ones. Here we can see how the clash between
traditional private international law and the European country-of-origin principle is
transformed from a mere methodological clash to a clash of principle. The central
criticism brought forward against the vested rights theory – it yields insufficiently to the
policies of sovereign states – reappears as criticism of the country-of-origin principle:
England must yield its sovereignty. Yet the same argument reappears as the main
justification for the country-of-origin principle: To disregard certain policies of member
states is a goal of the common market. Overcoming such policies is considered necessary
for the benefit of the market participants.189
Such policy differences can account for the different connecting factors used by
traditional private international law and the country-of-origin principle respectively. The
country-of-origin principle, based as it is on a formal connecting factor, frequently
designates a law different from the law with the closest connection, which traditional
private international law would designate. This is not an accident, and it can therefore not
be remedied by simple assimilation of the factors in both approaches. Traditional private
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international law, in designating the applicable law, will frequently designate the legal
order with the greatest regulatory interest, especially in the area of economic law, where
most clashes occur. The country-of-origin principle, by contrast, will frequently designate
a legal order that is relatively uninterested in strong regulation, especially of its exporters.
Whereas traditional private international law may tend towards overregulation, the
country-of-origin principle may counter this effect because it encourages
underregulation.190 The combination of both could just achieve an efficient equilibrium.
Similarly, the criticism that the vested rights theory prefers individuals over states can be
turned into a supporting argument. If the assumption is correct that the member states are
regulating more than what is good for its individual citizens, then the country-of-origin
principle could also be justified in favouring the interests of individuals over the interests
of states, especially those of the country of destination. This is in tune with Christian
Joerges’ interpretation of the Centros decision as one that gives citizens a right to hold
their governments accountable for their laws.191 Provided each member state complies
with certain minimum requirements (a provision fulfilled through harmonization), it can
be considered an undue burden for a supplier to have to comply with more than one law.
Finally, the criticism that the vested rights theory and the country-of-origin principle
favour one class of individuals over another without sufficient justification can be
countered, at least from a particular perspective. Take, for example, a consumer contract.
To critics, the passive consumer should be protected against the active supplier. His
reliance on applicability of his home law must be protected, because he has not left his
home. To proponents of the country-of-origin principle, the active supplier must be
protected against the consumer’s home laws for the sake of the common market. The
supplier furthers the common market by his transnational conduct; from a European
perspective, this is worthy of support. The passive consumer must be turned into an
active consumer, and the best way to do this is by taking away the legal advantages of
passivity. Obviously, this policy clash cannot be resolved on the basis of abstract and
neutral principles. But it seems worthwhile to consider whether the consumer protection
of traditional private international law could well be balanced with a counterweight,
provided the harmonization of European consumer law has reached a level at which
consumers can rely on protection by the supplier’s home law that is equivalent to his
home law.192
IV. SOME BROADER INSIGHTS

We have seen that the country-of-origin principle is indeed best understood as a
reinvigoration of the vested rights theory, and that both structural reasons of the European
Union and current policy preferences protect the country-of-origin principle against the
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criticism that brought the vested rights theory down. Now we can put these findings into
a broader perspective. Four broader insights emerge.
A first insight from the comparison with the vested rights theory suggests the limits of a
country-of-origin principle. The vested rights theory was successful as long as it was not
used as the exclusive approach to private international law. Only when it was expanded,
by Dicey and Beale, to cover all questions of private international law, the creation and
non-creation of rights, it failed – first because it was badly suited for questions of noncreation of rights, second, because it functioned badly in situations where, absent a
formal granting procedure, it was not clear whether a right had been granted or not. The
country-of-origin principle would benefit from a similar restriction. First, it should
remain applicable only to the granting of rights or privileges, not the imposition of
requirements. It is as badly suited for the general determination of the applicable law as
the vested rights theory. Second, the principle works best where a clear formal act of
granting takes place, like in the incorporation of a company, or the issuance of a licence.
The informal creation of rights is better achieved through traditional private international
law. In this (limited) sense it makes sense to distinguish the principle from private
international law.
A second insight goes the other way: Despite their similarity, the country-of-origin
principle and vested rights theory differ in important ways. The two share a common
structure and fulfil similar functions, but the justifications for those structures and
functions are quite different. The vested rights theory was justified by reference to a
higher set of principles thought beyond political control – ius gentium, general
international law, principles of justice. By contrast, EU law is based on economic and
political considerations; while EU law is also a higher set of rules and principles, it is by
no means beyond human control. The difference is important: Acceptance of the vested
rights theory presupposed only the conviction that a higher set of principles exist.
Acceptance of the country-of-origin principle and the scope of its application, by
contrast, presuppose a prior discussion of the appropriate economic and political goals to
be served by the law. In consequence, discourse about private international law and its
methods must become a discourse about economics and politics in order to remain
meaningful. Because private international lawyers know the vested rights theory, they
should be well equipped for such debates, but they must be ready to lead them. The return
of vested rights provides an excellent opportunity for such renewed debates.
Third, the comparison with the country-of-origin principle with its openly political
justification highlights the role that politics has played in the rise as well as the fall of the
vested rights theory. At the same time, in focusing on the rise and fall, the study should
also have shown the value of historical analysis. The vested rights theory emerged from
ideas of early liberalism: Individuals should have rights that the government cannot take
away from them; in times of emerging commerce this protection could not be confined to
innate rights, but had to be extended to acquired rights. By extension, in international
trade such rights had to be protected against foreign governments. At its heart, the vested
rights theory was thus a liberal theory that sought to protect a space of private ordering
against the policies of the state, very much like the country-of-origin principle is based on
liberal ideas of the predominance of the Common Market over the member states. This
idea of protection of spaces against the state is still visible in reconceptions of rights
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theories of private international law, like Lea Brilmayer’s theory of political rights.193
The theory predates the 19th century; it is contemporaneous to the justification of
subjective rights in post-medieval political thought. Nonetheless, it was in the 19th
century that vested rights were first thought to be the exclusive basis for private
international law. These attempts failed like the underlying jurisprudential idea
conceiving of legal systems as mere regimes for the protection of rights: rights as the
creation of state laws cannot simultaneously trump these laws. However, the rejection of
the vested rights theory went beyond this point and now had an equally political flavour.
The legal realists’ critique of rights came hand-in-hand with a rejection of the public /
private distinction and an emphasis on state policies, finding its high point in the New
Deal. The realists’ perspective that law was „really“ not about rights, but about state
policies replaced one kind of essentialism with another. In short, the vested rights theory
was a pre-national theory that broke down in the heyday of nationalism. Now that the
European Union has brought about a post-national constellation in which states’
sovereignty is restricted again, it is not surprising that an equivalent of the vested rights
theory is being reborn as well.
More generally, history shows that both theories and their restrictions are rarely abstract
truths but rather are contingent upon broader concepts – here concepts of law and
sovereignty. In a model of international relations in which the state’s sovereignty
determines everything, there is no place for a theory of vested rights. If no higher set of
values exists that can bind the state, and if private rights are considered entirely subject to
the states’ determination, then all questions are questions of allocation of prescriptive
sovereignty; vested rights that restrict this sovereignty have no role to play. Yet the
common market is not such a world. There is a superior set of rules in EU law, and the
restriction of state sovereignty is one of its declared goals for the benefit of the common
market.
A final, normative insight to be drawn from the history of these theories and from their
criticism and its rebuttal applies to the future of private international law in general.
Arguably, neither a pure focus on individual interests nor a pure focus on collective
interests appears appropriate for private international law (or for any area of the law).
This pluralism of interests is best served by a pluralism of methods. To base all private
international law within the European Union on a country-of-origin principle would be
folly. So would a total disregard of the principle. Private international law in the
European Union will remain a multi-track endeavour,194 but this is its asset rather than its
burden. The country-of-origin principle and traditional, state-based, private international
law are different techniques with different policies – one cannot be translated into the
other. This is a blow for those who hope for a coherent system of private international
law. But it is encouraging for those who believe that internal tensions within a legal
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system are necessary for development. A two-track concept of conflict of laws can bring
these tensions to the fore and thus enable us to formulate and address them.
This lets us see the protests against the country-of-origin principle in France and the
Netherlands in a new light. If private international lawyers recognize these protests and
the struggles over the country-of-origin principle as elements in a debate that is central to
the methods and the politics of their own discipline, they may well use this as an
opportunity for renewal in their own field. This should be good news for European law,
but it should be particularly good news for private international law.
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